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Why did reforming Eastern European countries adopt the electoral 
systems they did? Why, for example, did Poland adopt proportional 
representation while Hungary adopted a system of fairly strict majority 
rule? Often, the expectation is that new democracies will adopt electoral 
systems characterized by proportional representation rather than majority 
rule. This expectation is based on two (unwarranted) assumptions: (1) that 
proportional representation is better able to produce political stability and 
(2) that incumbent reformers care more about stability than about their 
own political power. Because it is reliant on these assumptions, the 
prevailing literature is unable to explain Hungary’s adoption of majority 
rule; it is also unable to explain the degree of proportional representation 
agreed upon in the process of democratic transition.  
In this paper, I present a formal model of regime transition that explains 
the electoral systems that emerged from democratic transition in Poland, 
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. Aside from explaining Hungary’s 
majoritarian outcome, the model holds without reference to the efficacy of 
proportional representation. It also makes simpler assumptions about the 
behavior of parties to constitutional negotiation. 
KEY WORDS:  Democratization; Electoral Systems; Authoritarian Regimes; Eastern 
Europe; Poland 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please. They 
do not make it under circumstances of their own choosing, but under 
circumstances that they stumble upon, inherited from the past. The 
tradition of all dead generations weighs down like a nightmare on the 
brains of the living. 
—Karl Marx 
                                                             
* I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the following individuals for their assistance 
at various stages of this project: Joyce Burnette, Arend Lijphart, Victor Magagna, Philip 
Michelbach, Matt Murphy, Kaare Strøm, and especially Ellen Comisso, whom I will miss.  
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In any peaceful transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, the political 
institutions that emerge are likely to be the result of bargaining between reformers and 
authoritarian incumbents. In determining the likely outcome of this process, we must 
concern ourselves with two vital questions: (1) In what context does transition bargaining 
occur? (2) To what end?  
Often, the expectation is that new democracies will adopt electoral systems 
characterized by proportional representation rather than majority rule (Lijphart 
1992:209). This expectation is based on two unwarranted assumptions, one concerning 
the efficacy of proportional representation itself and the other, the interests of the 
negotiating parties. First, it is often claimed that proportional electoral systems are better 
than majoritarian ones at managing conflict and representing divergent interests in a 
fledgling democracy. (See Lijphart [1977, 1992]; Linz [1990a, 1990b].) Although many 
theorists may tacitly assume that this is the case, however, the issue is still a matter of 
contention (Horowitz 1990; Mainwaring 1993). Second, although proportional 
representation may (or may not) be better at managing such conflicts, the hypothesis 
holds only if competing parties believe in its ability to do so, and if they care.  
Furthermore, the common analysis gives us no obvious way of determining the 
degree of proportional representation agreed upon in the bargaining process, and 
although it may (or may not) be true that no new democracy in Eastern Europe has an 
electoral system as purely majoritarian as that of Great Britain, the fact remains that the 
Hungarian system “belongs on the majoritarian side of the continuum” (Lijphart 
1992:212) (Figure 1). Thus, even if we agree that new democracies will adopt 
proportional electoral institutions, the assumption gives us no way of determining the 
degree of proportionality that results. 








Poland Czechoslovakia Hungary (UK) 
Source: Lijphart (1992:210), from Rokkan.  
Note: Hungary has single-member districts, a characteristic of majoritarian electoral 
systems. 
In the analysis that follows, I present a model of regime transition that explains 
the electoral systems that emerged from the democratic transitions of Poland, Hungary, 
and countries around Eastern Europe.1 I argue that the post-transition electoral systems 
that emerged in these countries resulted not so much from “altruistic” concerns about the 
national interest or societal well-being but from the self-interest of outgoing Communist 
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Party elites, who deliberately negotiated for post-transition electoral institutions that 
would maximize their influence in the new regime. Aside from explaining the more 
majoritarian nature of the Hungarian regime, this model holds without reference to the 
efficacy of proportional representation. It also makes simpler (and more realistic) 
assumptions about the behavior of parties to constitutional negotiation.  
Explanations regarding the electoral system chosen in the democratic transitions 
of Eastern Europe generally fall into one of three broadly defined categories (Renwick 
2006:37; Snyder and Mahoney 1999:104). Historical analyses explain the resulting 
electoral system in terms of the long- or short-term historical experience of the country in 
question. Socioeconomic analyses make reference, instead, to a regime’s desire for social 
and economic stability. Finally, institutional analyses explain the electoral systems that 
emerge in terms of the institutional structure of the old regime, especially with reference 
to the (one-) party system and the nature of its opposition. After examining each of these 
analyses in turn, I will present a formal model of democratic transitions from one-party 
rule.  
THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY IN REGIME CHANGE 
Historical analyses explain electoral choice in terms of the long- and short-term 
historical experience of the country in question. For the purposes of this analysis, 
“cultural” and “sociological” explanations are subsumed into this broader category, 
which also includes reference to “more immediate” historical concerns such as the timing 
and onset of democratic transition. In this section, I investigate the claim that historical 
factors such as the legacy of one-party rule and timing determined the institutional 
outcomes of democratic transition.   
Some historical analyses look to the legacy of one-party rule and Soviet 
domination to explain the resulting forms of government in Eastern Europe. In this view, 
the “past casts a long shadow on the present” and determines the social context in which 
transition negotiations take place (Crawford and Lijphart 1995:172). In explaining why 
some regimes didn’t adopt proportional representation in their transitions to democracy, 
for example, Arend Lijphart argues that decades of Communist Party domination in 
Hungary led to a deep distrust of political parties in that country. This skepticism, in turn, 
led to a cultural preference for an electoral system that was more “personalistic” than 
party-based because individual candidates for political office in Hungary were trusted 
more than the political parties they (nominally) represented. In this context, political 
reformers preferred majority elections and single-member districts to proportional 
representation because these majoritarian institutions were more likely to reward 
prominent individuals whereas PR leads to systems in which political parties are more 
dominant. In “Democratization and Constitutional Choices in Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary 
and Poland,” Lijphart (1992) argues that the prevailing skepticism in Hungarian political 
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culture gave politicians in that country a “strong incentive to emphasize personalities 
instead of parties.” Thus, he continues, 
to the extent that parties believe that their individual 
candidates are considerably more attractive than the parties 
as collectivities, they have a strong reason to opt for 
majoritarian elections in single-member districts instead of 
PR elections. Both factors played a major role in Hungary’s 
decision not to adopt PR. (P. 216) 
According to this historicallyoriented view of political transition, years of one-party rule 
and the resulting skepticism of Hungarian society led to the adoption of majoritarian 
electoral institutions because these institutions were seen as more likely to reward 
prominent politicians than the political parties they represented. 
Although Polish constitutional engineers shared these same concerns, they dealt 
with them in a very different way. With an open-list electoral system, Poland ensured that 
the power of party organizations was considerably reduced without having to sacrifice 
proportional electoral rules (Lijphart 1992:216). Furthering this view, Barbara Geddes 
notes that “politicians with high name recognition” will prefer open- to closed-list 
proportional representation (1995:242). In this view, Polish political culture shared 
Hungary’s distrust of political parties but dealt with this distrust by adopting open-list PR 
rather than majoritarianism and single-member districts.  
Although the foregoing analysis is helpful in illustrating how the historical 
context of transition can affect the political institutions adopted by a new regime, it 
simply brings the question “back” another step while doing little to resolve the deeper 
issue at hand. Yes, we may want to say, Hungary rejected PR because of its distrust of 
political parties. But with those very same factors at work in Poland, we are left to 
wonder why Poland would respond to this concern in one way (with open lists) and 
Hungary in another (via majoritarianism). If distrust of party politics was indeed common 
throughout the region, then this factor cannot be an adequate tool for predicting the 
differing institutional choices of Eastern Europe’s new democracies. Moreover, if Geddes 
is right and open-list PR is the system of choice for politicians with high name 
recognition, then we are left to wonder (1) if politicians in Poland really did have higher 
name recognition than those in Hungary (which would be contrary to what Lijphart 
[1992] argues, above) and (2) why Poland didn’t also adopt a majoritarian electoral 
system, which would seem at least equally suited for a society that emphasizes people 
over political parties. These questions leave us seeking a more fundamental explanation 
for the logic of democratic transition and electoral choice. 
Another set of arguments contends that the timing of regime transition affects 
institutional outcomes. Acknowledging that Poland’s Solidarity Party had to consent to 
relatively conservative compromises because of a lingering fear of Soviet intervention, 
Lijphart argues that the “big difference” between Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia 
is that Poland was the first country to begin the democratization process. At this early 
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stage of the game, the argument goes, political incumbents such as the Polish Communist 
Party still had enough implicit Soviet backing to adopt a PR system that would “lock 
them in” as players—albeit weakened ones—in the new political dynamic. By the time 
the other countries entered into the same process, the “threat of Soviet disapproval had 
receded” (Lijphart 1992:214). This may have emboldened quickly consolidating anti-
Communist majorities to push for majoritarian electoral systems that would effectively 
disenfranchise the forces of the old regime.  
As we shall see later, the dominance of the existing party organization and the 
structure of the party system will indeed affect the type of electoral system adopted 
during democratic transition. As Lijphart suggests, the timing of democratic transition 
may very well influence the dominance of existing party organizations, but timing itself 
is such an imprecise variable that it constitutes a weak foundation for a theory of 
democratic transition.2 After all, how are we to measure exactly when democratic 
transition actually begins? Although it is true that the Hungarian opposition “capitalized 
on the Polish experience” (which would be Lijphart’s implication), Ludwikowski (1996) 
argues that the Hungarian reforms of the late 1980s were the “first thorough 
constitutional transformations within the Soviet bloc” (p.152, 180, emphasis added). In 
other words, whereas some would argue that Poland adopted PR because its 
democratization started earlier than Hungary’s, others argue that Hungary was actually 
the first country in the Soviet Bloc to undergo this type of transformation. Of course, I’m 
not suggesting that either Lijphart or Ludwikowski got his assessment of history wrong. 
The point is that democratic transformations do not take place overnight; what begins as a 
minor reform in one place is carried a little further in another, and it is exceedingly 
difficult, if not impossible, to determine precisely where and when the transformation had 
its genesis. To say that the choice of electoral system results from the timing of 
democratic transformation is to base a theory of institutional choice on a factor that can 
never be measured with adequate precision. Although this doesn’t suggest that timing had 
no role in the determination of institutional outcomes, it does suggest that evidence of a 
causal link might be too subject to competing interpretations to be objectively reliable. 
We can’t base a theory of institutional choice on the timing of democratization if we are 
unsure about when democratization actually began.  
Another writer, Stanislaw Gebethner, also pays careful attention to the timing of a 
regime’s first free elections and the type of electoral system that results. He argues that 
the “major difference” between Poland and Hungary is that the first free elections in 
Hungary took place once the new multiparty system was “already fairly well formed.” In 
Poland, in contrast, the first free elections took place when the new multiparty system 
was still “in its infancy” (Gebethner 1996:63–4). Gebethner observes a correlation 
between Hungary’s relatively mature party system at the time of its first free elections 
and Hungary’s choice of majoritarian electoral institutions. Although the correlation is 
interesting and worthy of further investigation, it is not entirely clear why this factor 
would matter in the way the author suggests. Why should time reduce rather than 
enhance the degree of political fragmentation in a system? Besides, even if later elections 
really did contribute to a less fragmented party system (as they allegedly did in Hungary), 
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why would less fragmentation itself account for majoritarianism? Without a formal 
model of the dynamics of regime transition, Gebethner’s fascinating analysis tells us why 
a particular party system might be more or less fragmentary, but it does not help us 
predict why the chosen electoral rules would be majoritarian or proportional.  
As the analyses considered in this section suggest, historical factors such as the 
legacy of one-party rule and the timing of democratic transition play a crucial role in 
determining important characteristics of the new regime, but these important factors have 
not as yet been specified with the precision or predictive accuracy necessary for a 
rigorous model of democratic transition. The model I present below acknowledges and in 
fact relies upon an understanding that history, culture, and timing constitute the 
foundational context of any regime transition, but it also illustrates the particular way that 
these factors help determine whether a new democracy’s electoral institutions will be 
majoritarian or proportional.  
THE SEARCH FOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 
In the previous section, we examined a number of arguments that maintain that 
historical factors such as the legacy of one-party rule and the timing of democratic 
transition affect a new democracy’s choice of electoral institution. Now we turn our 
attention to a related set of arguments that see electoral system choice as part of a quest 
by incumbent elites to secure socioeconomic or political stability. While these arguments 
also help us to conceptualize democratic transition and electoral choice in a systematic 
way, they are similarly unsatisfying because they rely upon debatable assumptions about 
the efficacy of consociational institutions and because they’re too generous in their 
assumptions about the motives of incumbent political elites. In short, these arguments 
contend that authoritarian incumbents adopt proportional representation because they 
believe these institutions offer a new democracy its best chance of maintaining 
socioeconomic or political stability. The problem with these arguments, however, is that 
we can’t be sure that PR institutions really are the most likely to promote these ends, and 
we certainly can’t be sure that authoritarian incumbents would care about these ends in 
the first place, especially if they came at the expense of political power itself.  
A number of scholars argue that a country’s choice of electoral system is 
dependent upon its leaders’ expectations about which system will best serve the interests 
of economic and social stability. Following in this tradition, Stein Rokkan predicted that 
PR and presidentialism should have been the “prevalent new constitutional structures” in 
Eastern Europe because these consociational institutions were most likely to secure 
socioeconomic stability. (See Lijphart [1992]:209.)  
If we assume for a moment that political elites have only sincere intentions 
regarding the socioeconomic stability of their countries, the notion that proportional 
representation increases stability gives us reason to consider claims that countries facing 
higher degrees of instability might also opt for proportional electoral institutions. Thus, in 
Constitution-Making in the Region of Former Soviet Dominance, Rett Ludwikowski 
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(1996) argues that Hungary could afford to adopt majoritarian electoral institutions 
because it was one of the “[m]ore economically advanced” countries in East-Central 
Europe (p. 191). By contrast, Poland adopted proportional representation because its dire 
socioeconomic circumstances gave it no choice to do otherwise. The argument is that 
regimes will select proportional representation unless positive economic circumstances 
enable them to “afford” the alternative. 
An “ethnic” variation of this argument maintains that authoritarian incumbents in 
ethnically diverse societies will adopt proportional electoral institutions because these 
institutions are more likely to promote power sharing and to mitigate ethnic conflict 
(Lijphart 1977, 1992; Linz 1990a, 1990b). Explaining why the imperative to adopt PR 
was higher in some places than in others, for example, Arend Lijphart (1992) notes that 
the presence of “ethnic and religious minorities . . . provides a strong reason to adopt PR, 
because PR guarantees minority representation and can counter-act potential threats to 
national unity and political stability” (p. 216). Clearly, this was the decisive factor at 
work in Czechoslovakia, where PR was just one element of a “thoroughly 
consociational” system that also included federalism, power-sharing guarantees, and a 
mutual veto power for both ethnic groups (Lijphart 1992:216). Lijphart extends this 
analysis to the case of Poland, where ethnic pluralism was also a factor in the decision to 
adopt PR (p. 217). The explanation gains “further plausibility” when we recognize that 
“Hungary, the one country that opted against PR, is also the most ethnically 
homogeneous of the three—and, in fact, one of the least ethnically divided countries in 
all of Eastern Europe” (p. 217). This ethnic variant of the social-stability argument 
suggests that authoritarian incumbents in heterogeneous societies will adopt PR because 
of its superior ability to enhance minority representation and to accommodate ethnic 
difference. As with the economic variant of the argument, the implication is that outgoing 
elites will adopt PR unless ethnic homogeneity allows them to do otherwise.  
As the relative virtues and vices of proportional representation are still a matter of 
debate among political scientists, I find the aforementioned arguments to be problematic. 
In the very least, the lack of consensus about the efficacy of PR makes these arguments a 
poor basis for a generalizable theory of democratization. Consider for a moment the 
argument of György Szoboszlai, who, like Lijphart and Rokkan, also assumes that there 
is a relationship between proportional representation and regime stability, only for 
Szoboszlai (following from Mainwaring), the assumption is that the relationship is 
negative. In “Parliamentarism in the Making: Crisis and Political Transformation in 
Hungary,” Szoboszlai concedes that Hungary’s more majoritarian3 character “makes [its] 
political system less consensual by excluding minor parties from parliamentary 
representation.” But the exclusion of minor parties, Szoboszlai continues, also “helps 
coalition formation and increases the degree of governability” (Szoboszlai 1996:125, 
emphasis added). In other words, while some theorists (like Lijphart) argue that PR 
contributes to socioeconomic and political stability, others (like Szoboszlai) maintain that 
majoritarian institutions are superior for achieving these ends.4 As long as political 
theorists still debate the relative merits of PR and majoritarianism, it hardly makes sense 
to imagine that political actors have come to a consensus on the issue. In explaining why 
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democratizing countries adopted PR, we should seek explanations that do not rely on 
contentious assumptions about the efficacy of PR itself.  
Besides, it doesn’t make sense to assume that political elites would adopt electoral 
systems that are conducive to stability, even if they knew or agreed upon just which 
systems those were. The dominant forces in transition negotiations may not want to 
accommodate minority ethnic groups or even to promote economic prosperity if those 
ends come at the expense of political power itself. Indeed, even if it were agreed that 
proportional institutions enhanced the representation of ethnic minorities, that recognition 
itself might incentivize ethnic majorities to push for majoritarianism as a way of ensuring 
their continued domination in the political process. This dynamic seems to have been at 
work in Croatia, where “electoral laws favored the dominance of the Croatian majority” 
against the Serbian minority (Crawford and Lijphart 1995:189). A dominant ethnic group 
that voluntarily cedes power to a minority population is a selfless one indeed.5 The 
aforementioned arguments contend that political incumbents and constitutional engineers 
may have preferred PR to majoritarianism because they believed it would be better at 
maintaining stability in their economically vulnerable and deeply divided societies. 
Unfortunately, the post-Cold War history of the Balkans shows us that dominant ethnic 
groups often tailor electoral institutions so as to gain and maintain political power, even 
when this endeavor comes at the expense of socioeconomic stability (Crawford and 
Lijphart 1995:189; Gagnon 1995: passim). Given the choice between sharing political 
power or manipulating electoral institutions so as to maintain power, self-interested 
ethnic elites may be more likely to choose the latter. So long as decision makers are self-
interested, they may opt for a solution that maximizes their own political power at the 
expense of the regime’s stability or economic well-being. 
INSTITUTIONS AND THE EVOLUTION OF PARTY SYSTEMS  
IN NEW DEMOCRACIES  
In his study of the Hungarian transition from authoritarianism, Patrick H. O’Neil 
explains that the political order that emerges from democratic reform largely depends 
upon the (authoritarian) political institutions that preceded it. O’Neil explains that 
how authoritarian rule was first institutionalized in a given 
case is a key to a better understanding of variations in 
authoritarian transitions. Institutional orders determine the 
context that shapes not only the transition event itself but 
also the subsequent political order, that is, how 
authoritarianism dies and what replaces it. (1996:579) 
In this paper, I present a preliminary model for how the evolution of these new 
political orders might be better understood. The model is generalizable, meaning that it 
might be of value in understanding the nature of democratic transitions in regions outside 
of Eastern Europe, and it is exhaustive, in that it can explain the development of any new 
electoral system (majoritarian, consociational, or a hybrid of the two) based on 
Hollander  Democratic Transition and Electoral Choice  95 
 
differences in the initial conditions of the new democracy in question. Most importantly, 
perhaps, the model is based on simpler (and, arguably, more realistic) assumptions about 
the motives of political incumbents forced to undergo democratic reform. In my view, 
Communist Party officials in Eastern Europe were not necessarily concerned with the 
social, political, or economic stability of their countries in the post-transition period; 
rather, they engineered constitutional reform in such a way as to maximize the power 
they would still have in the new regime. In other words, this model requires only the 
relatively limited assumption that political incumbents want to hold on to what little 
power they can still hope to have in the new political order.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the Soviet Union in decline and with 
Communist parties throughout the region under intense pressure to reform, incumbent 
party officials faced a daunting and unappealing choice: They could give in to opposition 
pressure and introduce moderate reform or they could refuse to do so and wait to see 
where the winds of change would take them. Of course, reform was not inevitable. 
Romania’s dictator, Nicholai Ceacescu, dug in his heels, offered no realistic options, and 
wound up dead at the hands of a military firing squad. Across the world, near Tienanmen 
Square, Chinese political leaders also refused to give in to opposition demands and, in 
their case, successfully quelled the opposition and managed to remain in place. In most of 
Communist Europe, however, political elites voluntarily (if begrudgingly) gave in to 
what they saw as the inevitable and organized the first free and fair elections their 
countries had seen in decades.  
This is where the crucial choice examined in this paper first appeared to 
authoritarian incumbents. Having decided that some type of reform was the most prudent 
choice for their regimes, sitting governments across the region still had a great deal of 
influence over the type of elections they would hold. (See Dryzek and Holmes 
[2002]:passim.) My argument is that they tailored their choice of electoral institutions so 
as to maximize their representation in the new post-reform regime. Having resigned 
themselves to the notion that they would have to give up some power, outgoing 
authoritarians opted for new institutions that allowed them to give up whatever 
dominance they had to relinquish while preserving whatever power they could. 
In practice, this dynamic led Communist parties with only narrow support to 
adopt proportional representation, whereas incumbent parties with a wider base of 
support (such as Hungary’s) adopted majoritarian electoral institutions. The logic is that 
where Communist parties were weak, they would opt for electoral institutions that were 
proportional in nature and could therefore be expected to generate results where they 
would at least maintain a seat at the political table. (Indeed, the fact that incumbents 
usually found themselves in this situation explains why proportional representation was 
the more common choice!) In some cases (and Hungary seems to be one of these), 
however, Communist parties entered into negotiations having already co-opted portions 
of the opposition. In these cases, they enjoyed a wider (if not necessarily wide) base of 
support. By doing what they could to ensure that the reformed electoral system would be 
a majoritarian one, such parties expected to consolidate their grip on a larger portion of 
the political pie than their less popular counterparts in other countries. In short, if political 
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incumbents could expect to still be players in a majoritarian political system, they made 
arrangements for that to be the system they would have, but where they were 
marginalized and knew that majoritarianism would lead to their complete exclusion from 
the political system, Communist reformers opted for PR electoral systems that would at 
least lock in the minimal support they had. 
Let us consider how this dynamic unfolded in three East European Communist 
countries that experienced peaceful reform during the period in question (1989–1990). 
Following the brutal crackdown of the Prague Spring in 1968, the Communist party in 
Czechoslovakia enjoyed free reign (and Soviet backing!) to purge its ranks of 
intellectuals, freethinkers, and anyone who didn’t condemn the uprising loud or early 
enough to satisfy the Party’s Old Guard. This house-cleaning operation left a Communist 
Party in Czechoslovakia where the “institutionally loyal [were] in clear control” (O’Neil 
1996:586). The unforeseen consequence of the purge, however, was that the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party was small, marginalized, and in power only by the grace 
(and guns) of its Soviet backers. This model suggests that, with such a narrow base of 
support, the Czechoslovak Communist Party would lobby for electoral institutions that 
would allow it to preserve whatever power it could reasonably hope to maintain. 
Moreover, whereas the outgoing Communist Party in Czechoslovakia was small 
and marginalized, the party system that replaced it was fractured and unstable. According 
to Petr Kopecký, strong personalities and shifting coalitions contributed to a party system 
in the early 1990s that defied institutionalization (Kopecký 2007:142; see also Elster, 
Offe, and Preuss 1998:114–117). The fractionalization of Czechoslovak society and of its 
newly emergent party system can be seen as both cause and consequence of the strategy 
of its outgoing authoritarian incumbents. Working in the context of a political society that 
was increasingly divided and beset by cross-cutting cleavages, these outgoing leaders had 
a strong incentive to develop the electoral institutions necessary to survive in a new, 
fractured, and unstable party system.  
In Poland, the last decade of leadership by the Polish United Workers’ Party (the 
PZPR) was characterized by similar repression of dissidents and of the growing 
Solidarity Movement. During this period, the party experienced numerous 
“reorganizations” of its internal political leadership. The chronic repression of 
independent voices, argues Patrick O’Neil, had “disastrous” results that “eroded domestic 
institutional linkages and paved the way for . . . the party’s desperate recourse to martial 
law” (1996:586). After a decade of brutal repression, the remains of the PZPR, like their 
Czechoslovak counterparts, might also have hoped for a proportional electoral outcome 
that would help them maintain whatever political power they could.  
As in Czechoslovakia, the party system that was to emerge in Poland was 
fractured, unstable, and unpredictable. Before a new law raised registration thresholds in 
1997, the Polish political system saw a proliferation of new political parties, with 370 
new parties officially registered in the years that followed democratic transition 
(Jasiewicz 2007:85). In fact, Polish political parties even eschewed the title of “party” 
itself, preferring instead to adopt party names with identifiers such as “union,” “alliance,” 
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or “movement” (Jaseiwicz 2007:86). Expecting what was indeed to become an “alphabet 
soup” of political parties and coalitions (Jaseiwicz 2007:86), Poland’s outgoing 
authoritarian incumbents also opted for the PR electoral institutions that, at least in their 
expectations, would allow them to preserve a modicum of political power.   
By contrast, in the aftermath of the 1956 revolution in Hungary, Communist Party 
officials in that country adopted a more liberal policy of co-opting their political 
opponents. “While this had the intended effect of blocking the formation of social 
opposition,” O’Neil argues, “it also moved an important segment of intellectual dissent 
into the ranks of the party itself” (1996:587). Moreover, when János Kádár took over as 
the new general secretary of the Communist Party in 1962, he pursued a policy of 
“reconciliation rather than continued force” (1996:587). Thus, where other regimes in 
Eastern Europe drove potential opponents “out of the party and sow[ed] the seeds of later 
opposition movements,” Hungary’s Communist Party was characterized by internal 
opposition and individuals who entered the party ‘so that’ they could transform it 
(1996:588; emphasis in original). Of course, this is not to say that Hungary’s Communist 
Party ever actually attained the type of popularity it hoped to achieve.6 Still, the nature of 
its support and its internal composition were quite different than that of its Czechoslovak 
and especially Polish counterparts. This unique internal composition, I argue, led 
Hungary’s Communist reformers to expect that they would have more to gain from an 
electoral system that had significant majoritarian elements. 
Indeed, in the Round Table Negotiations that accompanied democratic transition 
in Hungary, the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP) favored a one-vote, single-
member district formula—institutions of classic, electoral majoritarianism. “The reason,” 
argue Elster, Offe, and Preuss, “was to maintain the existing constituencies in which the 
communists had better-known representatives and dominated the whole infrastructure” 
(1998:118). In so doing, Elster, Offe, and Preuss continue, the HSWP created an electoral 
system in which it seemed likely that it would achieve “a governing majority under a 
majoritarian system with only a minority of the votes” (1998:118; emphasis added). In 
direct contrast to the Polish and Czechoslovak cases, outgoing authoritarian leaders in 
Hungary saw majoritarian electoral institutions as a way to enhance their influence in the 
new regime. Thus, in the negotiations where they ultimately surrendered complete 
control over the political system, they created the very conditions by which they hoped to 
maintain the largest share of political power they thought possible. 
In sum, authoritarian political elites in Poland, who enjoyed support among only a 
narrow segment of the population, opted for a system of proportional representation 
because such an electoral system guaranteed their party at least a say in the political order 
that followed. It seems as though Poland’s authoritarian party could do no better, given 
the situation it was in. In Hungary, in comparison, the Communist Party enjoyed a wider 
base of support. By doing what it could to ensure that the reformed electoral system 
would have majoritarian elements, it locked in its seat at the table in the new regime.  
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MODELING DEMOCRATIC REFORM AND ELECTORAL CHOICE  
Although the negotiations that led to free and fair elections in Eastern Europe 
were undoubtedly complicated, extensive, and messy, a game-theoretic model of the 
situation illustrates the key players and their choices. In this simplified, parsimonious 
form, the dynamic of incumbent-opposition negotiation and the electoral regimes that 
result is clear, general, and applicable to situations of democratic reform in other regions 
and historical epochs.  
As I have modeled it (Figure 1), the situation begins when the incumbent 
Communist Party first faces demands by the opposition for democratic reform. Because it 
is already established and because the onus of genuine transformation is technically its 
own, the Communist Party moves first, offering the opposition free and fair elections 
characterized by electoral institutions of the Party’s own choosing. The key suggestion of 
my argument is that authoritarian incumbents will choose the electoral system that they 
believe will maximize their representation in the new post-Communist regime.  
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Of course, formally speaking, authoritarian incumbents have the option to do 
nothing at all, but if the incumbents choose not to decide, they still have made a choice—
a choice that in the short run preserves the status quo but in the long run leaves the old 
regime exposed to the risk of continuing political dissent or even violent overthrow. Even 
in the “best” of circumstances, failing to find an acceptable compromise can be costly for 
all involved. Thus, there was a very real incentive—and, empirically speaking, a very real 
tendency—for regimes in Eastern Europe to avoid this situation. Indeed, of all the 
authoritarian regimes in the region, only Romania’s embattled regime failed to find a 
compromise that its opponents would find acceptable.  
The model presented in this paper, then, doesn’t deal with situations such as the 
Romanian one, in which the regime failed to offer a negotiated settlement that was 
acceptable to the opposition. Rather, it deals only with the empirically more common 
situation, in which outgoing political elites tried to manage political transformations that 
they saw as inevitable. The model predicts that an incumbent’s initial offer of 
majoritarian versus proportional electoral institutions was largely determined by the 
incumbent’s own assessment of which institutions would best allow it to maintain 
influence after democratic transition. By this logic, outgoing authoritarian elites simply 
choose (and offer) the electoral institutions that they believe maximize their power—or 
minimize their loss—in the new regime.  
Of course, for the opposition, this is a Hobson’s choice, because failure to accept 
an incumbent’s offer leaves the opposition even worse off than it would have been if the 
offer had never been made. Opponents who fail to accept reasonable offers, like 
incumbents who fail to make them, can expect everything from protracted negotiations 
and continued unrest to strikes, riots, massacres, and even civil war. Unless both sides 
vastly overestimate their chances of prevailing in the maelstrom, they both have 
considerable incentive to find a reasonable compromise. The potential for failure is 
painful for both sides, and this propels incumbents to propose, and opponents to accept, 
reasonable compromises. The fact that most democratic transitions in the region were 
peaceful can be seen as affirmation that mutually agreeable compromises were usually 
found.  
My argument recognizes that incumbents have an incentive to play an active role 
in this process and to use their privileged position as agenda-setters to make offers that 
their opponents can’t refuse. The extensive form presented here demonstrates exactly 
why this is the case.  
CONCLUSION  
In the foregoing analysis, I have conceptualized democratic transition and 
constitutional design as a negotiated process between authoritarian incumbents, on the 
one hand, and political reformers, on the other. This analysis assumes that the Communist 
Party itself would be a player in the negotiations that set the terms of its exit from 
absolute power. It also models, in abstract and general terms, how the dynamics of such a 
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transition may take place. It thereby sets the agenda for future research that might seek to 
determine (1) how, and to what extent, outgoing authoritarians really were parties to 
negotiations about new electoral systems and (2) how, and to what extent, parties’ 
expectations about electoral outcomes actually shaped their preferences for certain 
electoral systems over others.  
The primary advantage of this model over the alternatives is that it relies on more 
realistic assumptions about human behavior, and especially about the behavior of 
Communist Party incumbents who, in some cases, had spent decades doing whatever they 
could to maintain political power. I have no doubt that, all else being equal, these 
dictators desired for their countries stable and prosperous futures. All else wasn’t equal, 
however, and so when the choice was between a stable, prosperous future and a future in 
which they could maximize their power in the new regime, I argue, authoritarian elites 
had every incentive to choose the latter.  
Today, as we ponder the tumultuous changes going on in the Middle East, it 
behooves us to learn what we can from the democratic transitions of decades past. The 
dynamic discussed in this paper reminds us that democratic reform is seldom as clear or 
as complete as it may first appear. Dictators don’t always fight to a fiery end, but neither 
must they go gentle into that good night. They can, instead, manipulate the constitutional 
foundations of the new regime so as to ensure that their actions weigh heavily on the next 
generation. Democratic revolutions are seldom as complete or as lasting as democratic 
reformers hope they will be. As we near their 25th anniversary, the European 
transformations of 1989 appear to be stable. The European revolutions of 1848, of course, 
were not, and so, as we witness yet another Springtime of Peoples, this one in the Middle 
East, we would do well to remember this lesson and to temper our optimism accordingly, 
for as Karl Marx remarked after observing the failure of 1848, all great historical events 
happen, as it were, twice. The problem is that they happen “the first time as tragedy, the 
second time as farce.”  
ENDNOTES 
1. Although I draw primarily from Poland and Hungary (and secondarily from 
Czechoslovakia) for examples, the model presented in this paper has similar 
applicability throughout the region and, I suspect, even to democratization processes 
more generally. 
2. The problem is not so much that timing-based theories of transition are wrong but that 
we have no good way of knowing if they are right. 
3. Strictly speaking, the Hungarian electoral system is not purely majoritarian but 
“mixed majoritarian-PR” (Szoboszlai 1996, p.125, emphasis added). Still, we are 
speaking in relative terms and comparing the Hungarian system to that of Poland, 
which is more-strictly proportional. 
4. To be fair, Szoboszlai’s analysis is not so much normative as it is positive. His 
primary concern was to explain the instability and lack of consensus that existed in 
Hungary in the 1990s rather than to explain how elites addressed it. Still, insofar as 
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we might assume that political elites value things such as consensus and 
governability, and insofar as these factors are especially crucial in societies 
undergoing transformation, we can glean from his description an expected correlation 
between majoritarianism and regime stability. 
5. Of course, one could argue that even a selfish dominant group would value stability 
because stability is in the interest of all parties, but this still leaves us asking why one 
dominant population (such as the one in Poland) would have a longer time horizon 
than another (in Croatia). 
6. Communist parties throughout the region were woefully misinformed about their 
prospects for survival in truly competitive electoral environments. (See Timur Kuran 
[1995].) 
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